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ABSTRACT 
 On 17 July 1998, a total of 120 States, including Malawi, voted for the 
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 
permanent ICC became operational on 1 July 2002. The ICC has jurisdiction 
over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. These 
crimes are the most serious crimes of international concern. The ICC operates 
under the principle of complementarity, which entails that the ICC will only 
assume jurisdiction over these core crimes in the event that a State Party is 
unwilling and unable genuinely to carry out the investigation and prosecution. 
States Parties have, therefore, the primary responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes. The States Parties must therefore establish jurisdiction 
to conduct investigations and prosecution of these core crimes. 
 It is from that background, coupled with the historical evolution and 
development of international criminal law, with regard to individual criminal 
responsibility, that this paper argues for the implementation of the Rome 
Statute in Malawi, through domestic legislation.The paper thus argues that only 
through domestic legislation can the purports of the Rome Statute be achieved 
and fulfilled by Malawi. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1  Introduction to the Study 
International Criminal Law has undeniably become a very important and 
unavoidable feature of the international community. Prior to the end of WW I, 
international law and indeed international criminal law was mainly concerned 
with States and not individuals. It was only after WW I that attempts were made 
‘to establish international institutions to hold personally accountable, those 
responsible for the start of the war and violations of the laws of war.’1 These 
attempts did not materialize. It was only after the end of WW II, that victorious 
Allied Powers, the United Kingdom (UK), France, the USA, and the Soviet 
Union, at the London Conference, finally resolved, through the London 
Agreement, to punish the high-ranking Nazi war criminals.2 Thus the ‘London 
Agreement and its accompanying Nuremberg Charter, resulted in the 
establishment of the International Military Tribunal (the IMT) at Nuremberg to 
prosecute individuals, especially the Nazi war criminals for crimes against 
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.’3 Subsequently the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the IMTFE) was established to 
prosecute and punish Japanese war criminals for similar offences.4 In an 
attempt to demonstrate why Malawi has to implement the Rome Statute of the 
                                                            
1 Cryer (2005:32). 
2 Cryer (2005:37). 
3 Cassese (2002:7). 
4 Cassese (2002:7). 
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International Criminal Court5 (Rome Statute) through legislation, this research 
paper analyses the evolution of international criminal law culminating in the 
adoption of the Rome Statute, and the obligations of State Parties to the Rome 
Statute. This will enable a clear understanding of why Malawi is under an 
obligation to follow the ratification of the Rome Statute with its incorporation into 
the municipal law. The research paper is thus concerned with the 
implementation of international criminal law in national jurisdictions, with 
emphasis on the Republic of Malawi (Malawi). The research paper 
concentrates on the implementation of international criminal law in Malawi 
through the Rome Statute. Throughout the evolution and development of 
international criminal law, the main feature has been holding individuals, 
regardless of their official capacities, criminally liable for international crimes. 
With the adoption of the Rome Statute, States Parties, have strongly 
demonstrated their strong will to prosecute individuals for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.6 
By ratifying the Rome Statute, Malawi, just like other States Parties, 
demonstrated her commitment towards prosecution of individuals who commit 
international crimes as stipulated under the Rome Statute, and thereby 
contributing towards bringing an end to impunity. 
 
 
                                                            
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 
999. 
6 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
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1.2  Background to the Study 
 
On July 17 1998, a total of 120 states voted for the adoption of the Rome 
Statute.7 The permanent International Criminal law (ICC) became operational 
on 1 July 2002, with the jurisdiction to ‘try individuals or persons who are 
accused of the most serious crimes of international concern.’8 Thus, the ICC 
has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, and the crime of aggression once a definition has been adopted.9 
This does not mean that the ICC has assumed or taken over the primary 
jurisdiction of States to investigate and prosecute these crimes, but its 
jurisdiction will only be complementary to national jurisdictions.10 ‘National 
jurisdictions will thus, retain precedence for the prosecution of these crimes 
unless the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out investigation or 
prosecution.’11Malawi having ratified the Rome Statute on 19 September 
2002,12 demonstrated and emphasized her commitment to investigate and 
prosecute these crimes. The ratification of the ICC alone is not enough. With 
the ratification of the Rome Statute, Malawi incurred further obligations since for 
the ICC ‘to be effective, it will depend not only on widespread ratifications of the 
Rome Statute, but also on States Parties complying fully with their treaty 
obligations, which almost for every state will require some change to 
                                                            
7 UN. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9. 
8 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
9 Rome Statute, Art. 5. 
10 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
11 Werle (2009:83), see also Rome Statute, Art. 17. 
12 Information available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_Parties_to_the_Rome_Statute_of_the_International_Crimina
l_Court (accessed on 30.05.2010). 
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municipal/domestic law.’13 Despite the Rome Statute not imposing or 
‘establishing any obligations regarding the incorporation of the Rome Statute’s 
substantive criminal law into national law.’14 This paper argues that it is the 
responsibility of States Parties to adapt their domestic laws in line with the 
obligations they have assumed under the Rome Statute, in order to effectively 
bring to fruition the aspirations of the ICC. Malawi is no exception. 
Malawi follows the English common law system. This results from the fact that 
Malawi was a British Protectorate for many years. In that regard the Malawi 
legal system is premised on the British legal system. The Republic of Malawi 
Constitution of 1995 is the supreme law of the land.15 All laws in Malawi derive 
their authority from this constitution. The constitution regulates the conduct of 
government business in the land. In that regard the constitution further 
stipulates modes of applicability of international law and international 
agreements in Malawi. In section 211 of the constitution it provides for and 
envisages three ways or instances, that is, any international agreement entered 
into after the commencement of this constitution shall form part of the law of the 
republic if so provided by or under an Act of Parliament;16 binding international 
agreements 17entered into before the commencement of this constitution, shall 
continue to bind the Republic unless otherwise provided by an Act of 
Parliament; and customary international law, unless inconsistent with this 
                                                            
13 Human Rights Watch (2001:3). 
14 Werle (2009:118). 
15 Republic of Malawi Constitution, s.5. 
16 Republic of Malawi Constitution, s.211(1). 
17 Republic of Malawi Constitution, s. 211(2). 
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constitution or an Act of Parliament, shall form part of the law of the Republic.18  
It would seem clear therefore, that with the exception direct application of 
customary international law in Malawi, international agreements require 
legislative intervention by Parliament, in order to form part of municipal law. The 
Rome Statute thus would require domestic legislation in order to form part of 
municipal law. This constitutional provision, though, despite seemingly clear, 
has created legal uncertainty in Malawi, as regards applicability of international 
law, due to different court interpretations ascribed to it. The Rome Statute, 
without being domesticated by legislation, would fall into this legal uncertainty, 
and thereby its applicability in Malawi would be put in jeopardy. This paper 
therefore argues for the need to incorporate the Rome Statute in Malawi 
through legislation, in order to avoid and do away with the uncertainty of its 
applicability in Malawi. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Despite the Rome Statute not imposing any obligations on States Parties, and 
Malawi, in particular, regarding the incorporation of the Statute’s substantive 
criminal law into national/municipal law, the legal uncertainty in Malawi, weighs 
heavily in favour of incorporating the Rome Statute into municipal law through 
legislation. This is so because the legal uncertainty in Malawi, as regards 
applicability of international agreements, is certainly as a result of not following 
up ratified treaties or international agreements with the necessary legislation as 
stipulated by the constitution. If the Rome Statute is not incorporated into the 
                                                            
18 Republic of Malawi Constitution, s. 211(3). 
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municipal law by legislation, it will certainly fall into the category of the other 
international agreements Malawi has ratified without further 
domesticating/incorporating them into municipal/domestic laws. The objective 
of this paper is therefore aimed at demonstrating the need to have the Rome 
Statute implemented in Malawi, through legislation. Non domestication of the 
Rome Statute in Malawi will render its applicability in Malawi uncertain, and 
thereby its ratification would end up being an exercise in futility.  
 
1.4 Literature Review  
Much has been published in the field of international criminal law and its 
domestication. In his discussion of implementation of international criminal law, 
and the Rome Statute, in particular, in national jurisdictions, Werle19 first 
emphasizes the fact that the Rome Statute does not establish any obligations 
regarding the incorporation of the Statute’s substantive criminal law into 
national law. He however appreciates that the Rome Statute encourages States 
to do so, and goes on to discuss different models of domesticating international 
criminal law. Kleffner on the other hand, argues that the principle of 
complementarity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, clearly refers to national 
jurisdictions that have established domestic jurisdiction in conformity with 
international law.20 He further argues that it would be a misnomer for the ICC to 
defer jurisdiction for the investigation and prosecution the ICC core crimes to 
States which have neither established domestic jurisdiction over such nor to 
                                                            
19 Werle (2009:118). 
20 Kleffner (2008:113). 
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States that have established such jurisdiction in violation of international law.21 
In the final analysis he argues that complementarity principle envisages that 
States Parties have to domesticate the Rome Statute. 
In his discussion on implementation of international law generally, Cassese 
dicusses three theoretic approaches of implementation: ‘monistic view 
advocating the supremacy of municipal law; dualistic doctrine, suggesting the 
existence of two distinct sets of legal orders (international law, on one side, and 
municipal legal systems on the other), and finally the monistic theory 
maintaining the unity of various legal systems and the primacy of international 
law.’22He further argues that implementation of international law in domestic set 
up is very crucial, though he laments lack of uniformity and international 
regulation on the modality of such implementation.23 He thus acknowledges 
that implementation of international law in national jurisdictions is dependent on 
the peculiar legal system of a particular State. On the other hand, Slyz 
discusses implementation of international law in national jurisdictions in relation 
to self-executing and non-self-executing provisions of treaties or international 
agreements. His argument is thus, self-executing treaties or international 
agreements can be applied directly in municipal jurisdictions, whereas non-self-
executing treaties and international agreements must be grounded in municipal 
law in order to be applicable.24Thus, he propounds the view that domestication 
                                                            
21 Kleffner (2008:114). 
22 Cassese (2005:213). 
23 Cassese (2005:219) 
24 Slyz (1995-1996:78). 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
of international agreements and treaties will depend on whether they are self 
executing or non-self-executing. 
These authors have thus, discussed the applicability of international law from 
different perspectives. However, in so far as there are gaps in addressing the 
implementation of international law in Malawi, the research paper will 
complement the existing publications in taking into account the legal 
developments in Malawi. Although there is consensus that the Rome Statute 
places no obligations on States to incorporate its substantive criminal law in 
municipal, it is the central argument of this paper that the legal uncertainty in 
Malawi, as regards applicability of international law, weighs heavily in favour of 
domestication of the Rome Statute. Non-domestication of the Rome Statute will 
render its applicability in Malawi, uncertain. The legal uncertainty is 
demonstrated by a discussion of the two adoption cases in Malawi by 
Madonna. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
Application of international law and international agreements in Malawi, where 
there is lack of domestication, is primarily dependent on the whims of a 
particular judge. This signifies the legal uncertainty as regards international 
agreements that have not been incorporated into the municipal law through 
legislation. If the Rome Statute is not domesticated through legislation, Malawi 
will fail to effectively investigate and prosecute the core crimes as stipulated in 
the Rome Statute. Non-domestication of international agreements has resulted 
in the legal uncertainty on applicability of international law and international 
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agreements in Malawi. Only through legislative domestication can the Rome 
Statute be effectively applied in Malawi, anything to the contrary will render it 
meaningless.  
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The study or research, is primarily desk top based. It looks at and analyses the 
publications available, legislation and case law primarily from Malawi, and a 
selected few other jurisdictions. More specifically, the paper analyses the two 
adoption cases by Madonna, in so far as they demonstrate and portray the 
uncertainty in the application of international law in Malawi. These cases 
demonstrate the difficulty or uncertainty of application of international law in 
Malawi vis-à-vis the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989. Malawi 
is a party to the CRC, but by the time these cases were decided had not yet 
incorporated it into the municipal law. 
 
1.7 Overview of Chapters 
This paper has five chapters. In the second chapter, an overview of the 
evolution of international law is provided as a basis for a clear understanding of 
the importance of the Rome Statute in the prosecution of individuals who 
commit international crimes and the fight against impunity. The paper therefore 
discusses the quest by international law to hold individuals and not States, 
criminally liable for the commission of these crimes. This chapter further 
discusses the ambivalent view of Africa, through mainly the AU as regards the 
perception of bias by the ICC in its conduct. 
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Chapter three discusses and analyses the different modes of implementing 
international law, in particular, the Rome Statute in national jurisdictions. The 
chapter therefore discusses the monistic and dualist views as regards different 
outlooks and approaches in the implementation of international law. 
Chapter four discusses and analyses the legal system in Malawi, and the 
resultant legal uncertainty, as regards the implementation or applicability of 
international law and international agreements in Malawi. The chapter thus 
discusses the need for creating legal certainty in Malawi, through the 
incorporation of international agreements, in particular, the Rome Statute, into 
municipal law through legislation. The chapter further argues for the 
amendment of statutes that impede the applicability of the Rome Statute in 
Malawi. 
Chapter five analyses the paper by way of conclusion and provides 
recommendations on the approach Malawi must adopt to fully implement the 
Rome Statute. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 
AMBIVALENCE OF AFRICA ON THE ICC 
2.1 Historical Background 
International Criminal Law has through the decades gone through a 
metamorphosis, from, as already observed, being concerned with States to 
individual criminal responsibility. However ‘establishing individual criminal 
responsibility under international law faced obstacles which had to be 
overcome, since under classic and traditional international law, States not 
individuals were the exclusive subjects, and it was also necessary to overcome 
states’ defensive attitude towards outside interference, which was rooted in the 
concept of sovereignty.’25 In this regard, prior to the end of WW I, ‘no feasible 
mechanism could be brought into being that could enable a State official, let 
alone a Head of State accused of war crimes or other outrages to be brought to 
justice serve by a victor State following an international armed conflict.’26  
This paper therefore is restricted to analyzing the evolution of international law 
from the end of WW I, when imposition of individual criminal responsibility was 
considered, from the end of WW II, when individual criminal responsibility was 
actually imposed on the Nazi leadership, and further developments up to the 
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 17 July 
                                                            
25 Werle, (2009:3).  
26 Cassese, (2002:5). 
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1998. In this chapter, the paper therefore, gives an overview evolution of 
international law through the Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919, The IMT 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), The Charter 
of the Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and finally the Rome Statute. It also analyses the 
ambivalence of Africa on the ICC after its initial endorsement and acceptance 
of the ICC, and the impact it might have on applicability of the Rome Statute in 
Africa. 
 
2.2 The Versailles Treaty27  
The international communities’ dilemma of how to deal with war criminals 
continued until after WW I. In fact at the end of the said war, the Allied Powers, 
France, Britain and the USA, struggled with the problem of how to deal with ‘the 
prosecution of Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II, German war criminals and Turkish 
officials for crimes against humanity.’28 This dilemma ended in the in the ‘Treaty 
of Peace between the Allied & Associated Powers and Germany (Peace Treaty 
of Versailles or The Versailles Peace Treaty), concluded on 28 June 1919 at 
the Versailles Palace in Paris, France.’29The international community had 
always failed to punish alleged war criminals in the past and the Versailles 
Treaty presented an opportunity to impose international criminal law on 
                                                            
27 Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at 
Versailles, 28 June 1919 [1920] ATS 1 (entered into force 10 January 1920), online at 
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents227.html (accessed on 
30.05.2010). 
28 Maogoto,(2009:14). 
29 Maogoto (2009:14). 
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individuals for the atrocities committed during the war. As a consequence, ‘the 
Allied and Associated powers publicly arraigned William II of Hohenzollern, 
formerly German Emperor, for the supreme offence against international 
morality and sanctity of treaties.’30 It must be observed that although the 
arraignment was initiated by the Allied and Associated powers, who were also 
going to provide the judges,31 this was a positive development under 
international law. For the first time a leader of a country was going to personally 
for offences against international morality and sanctity of treaties as opposed to 
just holding, German responsible. Despite all this, the tribunal was apparently 
not constituted, the Dutch government refused to extradite the Kaiser, and 
consequently he was never tried. It would only be after the World War II, that 
individuals would finally be tried for inter alia, war crimes, under the Nuremberg 
Charter. 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 See Versailles Treaty,  Art. 227: ‘The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II 
of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for supreme offence against international morality 
and sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby 
assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five 
judges, one appointed by each of the following powers: namely, the The USA, Great Britain, 
Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international 
policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the 
validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should 
be imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the 
Netherlands for the surrender to them of the Ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. 
(online at: http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents227.html -accessed 
on 30.05.2010).   
31 Versailles Treaty, Art. 227. 
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2.3 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg 
Charter). 
A positive development in international criminal law, that is, holding individuals 
criminally responsible under international criminal law occurred at the end of 
WW II. It was at the end of WW II, that the four victorious Allied powers, the UK, 
France, the The USA, and the Soviet Union, finally agreed under the London 
Agreement of 8 August 194532, to prosecute the Nazi leadership. The London 
Agreement provided ‘for the establishment of an International Military Tribunal 
for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no geographical location.’33 
Annexed to the London Agreement was the Nuremberg Charter which provided 
‘that there would be individual responsibility for the following crimes under the 
International Military Tribunal’s jurisdiction: crimes against peace, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.’34It has been argued that the Nuremberg Charter 
‘was the basis of the trial of the major war criminals, and that it can be 
considered the birth certificate of international criminal law.’35During the 
Nuremberg Trial, “against Goering et al” which began on ‘20 November 1945, 
24 people were indicted, 21 were actually brought to trial, and one Martin 
Borman was tried in absentia.’36The charges brought against the defendants 
were, the common plan or conspiracy to wage an aggressive war in violation of 
international law or treaties –Crimes Against Peace (Count One); planning, 
                                                            
32 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis (online at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/350?open document –accessed on 30.05.2010). 
33 London Agreement, Art. 1,see also Werle, (2009:7). 
34 Nuremberg Charter, Art.6. 
35 Werle, (2009:7). 
36 Werle (2009:9). 
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preparation, or waging an aggressive war (Count Two); war crimes (Count 
Three); and crimes against humanity (Count Three).37At the end of the trial, ‘the 
Tribunal delivered its judgment on 30 September and 1 October, and upon 
convictions, twelve defendants were sentenced to death, three were sentenced 
to life imprisonment, four to prison terms of between ten and twenty years, 
three defendants were acquitted, and four groups, the Nazi Party’s political 
leadership corps and their staffs, the “Gestapo”, the “Sicheheitsdienst” (SD) 
and the regular SS and “Waffen SS.”’38 
The individual criminal responsibility for international crimes was further 
entrenched when the Tribunal stated that, ‘crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’39 
‘Absolute sovereign power was thus destroyed as previously there was a very 
clear and visible demarcation between domestic and international law, States 
were entitled to prosecute any offences committed by their nationals inside or 
outside their territory; and there were no international institutions for the 
prosecution of grave crimes.’40This was a major limestone in the development 
of international law in that individuals could now be held accountable for 
international crimes and they could not hide under the sovereignty principle. 
Despite this remarkable achievement there were some criticisms leveled 
against the whole process. 
                                                            
37 Austin, B.S. Legal Strategic Issues, (online at: http://frank.mtsu.edu/~baustin/trials.html -
accessed on 29.05.2010). 
38 Werle, (2009:9), (see also the Nuremberg Judgment of 1 October 1946). 
39 Nuremberg Judgment of 1 October 1946, p.55 , see also Werle (2009:7). 
40 Tomuschat, (2006:838). 
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2.3.1 Victors’ Justice    
The Nuremberg Trial and Judgment was criticized as representing victors’ 
justice. The Nuremberg Charter and the Tribunal were all constituted by the 
victorious Allied Powers. Even more ‘those jurists involved in the drafting of the 
IMT Statute later appeared as prosecutors, for example, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, the US Chief Prosecutor; or Judges, for example, Major General Ion 
T. Nikitchenko, the Soviet Judge.’41No judge or prosecutor from Germany or 
any neutral countries was involved. The Tribunal was further criticized ‘for 
rejecting the defendants’ tu quoque defence, the contention that Allied Powers 
also committed similar offences against the German people and yet only the 
Nazi leadership, the defendants, were being held to account.’42Furthermore, 
the whole process was flawed from inception because of the discriminatory 
nature of the trial considering that the IMT had been established solely ‘for the 
trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
countries.’43It was therefore not surprising that only Nazi war criminals were 
being prosecuted in the absence of any of the war criminals from the Allied 
Powers. This apparent discriminatory nature of the prosecutions enhances the 
belief and contention that this was victors’ justice. 
 
 
                                                            
41 Burchard (2006:803).  
42 Burchard (2006:805). 
43 Tomuschat (2006:833).  
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2.3.2 Ex-Post Facto Laws    
The other criticism leveled at the IMT was that the defendants were charged 
with offences which were non-existent before the war, for example crimes 
against peace (crime of aggression).44In that regard this contravened the 
nullum crimen, nullum poena sine lege principle under international criminal 
law, a principle of legality and punishment which entails that, ‘at the time the 
crime was committed, a written or unwritten norm must have existed upon 
which to base criminality under international law, and the principle further 
forbids retroactive punishment or analogies as a basis for punishment.’45 ‘The 
IMT took the defense’s ex post facto argument as an opportunity to examine 
(and affirm) the criminal nature of the crimes against peace at the time the 
crimes were committed by the defendants,’46stating thus, ‘In the first place it 
must be observed that the maxim “nullum crimen sine lege” is not a limitation of 
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to 
punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked 
neighbouring States without warning is obviously untrue, for in circumstances 
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to 
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. 
Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the 
defendants, or at least some of them, must have known of the treaties signed 
by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international 
disputes; they must have known that they were acting in defiance of all 
                                                            
44 Austin, supra note 14 
45 Werle (2009:37). 
46 Werle (2009:38). 
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International Law when in complete deliberation they carried out their designs 
of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it would appear that 
the maxim has no application to the present facts.’47 The IMT thus limited the 
application of the nullum crimen sine lege principle. In a way the IMT was 
clearly of the view that the crimes committed by the defendants were heinous 
and reprehensible that it was better to punish them anyway other than letting 
them free. It has further been argued that in respect of “crimes against 
humanity,” ‘there cannot be the slightest doubt that all offences set out under 
the title ‘crimes against humanity’ are not only morally objectionable, but 
deserve to be punished and must be punished because of their abhorrent 
character if peaceful coexistence in human society is to be maintained. Nobody 
can legitimately claim that he believed that such actions in which he 
participated and that are to be classified as ‘crimes against humanity’ were 
perfectly lawful. The scope of ratione materiae of the nullum crimen rule must 
accordingly be reduced. It should not be extended to conduct that the 
international community unequivocally condemns.’48 In this essence, the nullum 
crimen principle could not be used to free those responsible for these 
international crimes and let them go free, what was important was that their 
conduct was conduct which was widely condemned by the international 
community. In other words the end justified the means. 
                                                            
47 Nuremberg Judgment of 1 October 1946, pp.52-53. 
48 Tomuschat (2006:835). 
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Further criticisms were that there was no right of appeal if found guilty contrary 
to the dictates of criminal justice.49 The Tribunal in most part relied on hearsay 
evidence through admission of ex parte affidavits into evidence thereby denying 
the defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses.50 The defendants also 
complained that they were overwhelmed with the massive and crushing 
documentary evidence heaped on them whose authenticity could not be 
ascertained yet their defence team was denied access to the archives to help 
them obtain exculpatory evidence.51 There were several criticisms against the 
Nuremberg Trial and Judgment which for purposes of this paper is not 
necessary to delve into. However despite all these criticisms, one thing stands 
out, that is, individual criminal responsibility became entrenched in international 
criminal law as is evident in the subsequent legal developments in international 
criminal law under the Control Council Law No. 10, IMTFE, ICTY, ICTR and the 
Rome Statute. 
 
2.4 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE/Tokyo 
Charter) 
The Tribunal was set up following the Nuremberg Tribunal, for ‘the just and 
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East.’52 The 
                                                            
49 Nuremberg Charter, Art. :26 ‘The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence of 
any Defendant shall give reasons on which it is based, and shall be final and not subject to 
review.’ 
50 Sharf, (1995).  
51 Burchard (2006:804). 
52 The IMTFE Charter, Art. 1 (online at: http://www.stephen.stratford.co.uk/imtfe_charter.htm ) 
accessed on 20.05.2010. 
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Tokyo Charter was ‘modeled on the Nuremberg Charter and adopted the 
Nuremberg crimes: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.’53 However unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal which was constituted by 
the victorious Allied Powers, the IMTFE  was constituted or proclaimed by the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur on 19 
January 1946.’54 Its composition was also a marked departure from the 
Nuremberg Tribunal as it also included representations from some other neutral 
countries.   
2.5 Control Council Law No.10 
Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL) ‘was enacted on 10th December 1945 for the 
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity.’55 Germany having been divided into zones after WW II, the 
CCL was thus enacted by the ‘acting legislative body for all Germany (the Allied 
Control Council for Germany).’56I n fact the aim of CCL was ‘to give effect to the 
so called Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945, and the charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to 
establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals 
and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the International 
Military Tribunal (emphasis added).’57 This was so because not every Nazi war 
                                                            
53 The IMTFE Charter, Art. 5: ‘….The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: (a) crimes 
against peace; (b) conventional war crimes; and (c) crimes against humanity.’  
54 Cassese (2002:9). 
55 Roberge, M-C (1997:651).  
56 Roberge M-C (1997:653). 
57 Control Council Law No. 10, preamble(online at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/inst/imt10.asp -
accessed on 29.05.2010). 
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criminal was charged and prosecuted in the Nuremberg Tribunal. Others were 
tried in the German national courts and other military tribunals depending on 
the zone. However ‘the law applied at Nuremberg and Tokyo was applied, 
confirmed and stated more precisely in these numerous trials before national 
courts and military tribunals.’58 It must be noted however that the most 
significant development under Article II(c) of the CCL as opposed to Article 6 
(c) is that ‘it removed the nexus between crimes against humanity and crimes 
against peace and war crimes, in that CCL does not include the words “before 
or during the war.”’59 As long as the acts constituting crimes against humanity 
were committed it does not matter whether they were committed during war or 
not, one would still be held criminally responsible. This was therefore a stark 
contrast to the Nuremberg Charter and therefore a significant development in 
international criminal law. In Einsatzgruppen case60 this was buttressed when 
the Tribunal stated thus; ‘The International Military Tribunal, operating under 
the London Charter, declared that the Charter's provisions limited the Tribunal 
to consider only those crimes against humanity which were committed in the 
execution of or in connection with crimes against peace and war crimes. The 
Allied Control Council, in its Law No. 10, removed this limitation so that the 
present Tribunal has jurisdiction to try all crimes against humanity as long 
known and understood under the general principles of criminal law.’61 Hence 
crimes against humanity did not require nexus to war under CCL. The offences 
                                                            
58 Werle (2009:12). 
59 Roberge, (1997:660). 
60 Einsatzgruppen case (The The USA vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al, Case No. 9), (online at: 
http://www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/04/NMT04-T0412.htm )-accessed on 01.06.2010. 
61 Einsatzgruppen Case p.499. 
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enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter were further adopted by the ICTY and 
ICTR. It is important to note that the ‘establishment of these ad hoc tribunals 
was possible due to the end of the so called Cold War and the need by the UN 
to assert itself by enforcing international criminal law to maintain and restore 
international peace and international security.’62 
 
2.6 The International Military Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
The ‘ICTY was set up in 1993 by the UN Security Council, pursuant to 
Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 and Resolution 827 of 5 May 1993.’63The 
ICTR was established ‘for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991.’64 This was as a result of the atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia during what has been called ‘one of the 
20th century’s worst conflicts on European soil.’65The ICTY’s jurisdiction 
therefore consisted of ‘the power to prosecute natural persons responsible for 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity when committed in armed conflict, 
which are beyond any doubt part of customary international law.’66 The crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the ICTY were thus essentially adopted from the 
                                                            
62 Werle (2009:15). 
63 Kittichaisaree (2001:22).  
 
64 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,  Art. 1. 
65 Werle (2009:16).  
66 ICTY Statute, Art. 2-8, see also Kittichaisaree (2001:23). 
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Nuremberg Charter, signifying further the importance of the Nuremberg Charter 
on the development of international criminal law and the need to hold 
individuals criminally responsible for committing such crimes. However the 
ICTY still maintained the nexus to war or armed conflict for crimes against 
humanity. Following the ICTY was the establishment of the ICTR, again by the 
UN. 
2.7 The International Military Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The ‘ICTR was set up by UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 
1994 in response to genocide and other systematic, widespread, and flagrant 
violations of international humanitarian law that had been committed in 
Rwanda.’67The ICTR was therefore established ‘to prosecute persons 
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed on the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994..’68 The 
ICTR therefore has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the protection of war victims, and of Additional Protocol II 
thereto of 8 June 1977.69 It must also be noted that just as CCL No.10, the 
ICTR Statute did away with the nexus between crimes against humanity and 
war, what is required is that particular crimes constituting crimes against 
                                                            
67 Kittichaisaree (2001:24).  
68 ICTR Statute, Article 1(see also the preamble). 
69 Kittichaisaree (2001:24). 
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humanity be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.70 
The ICTR, it has been argued has jurisdiction over crimes committed in internal 
armed conflict due to the absence of the ‘grave breach’ regime under its 
statute.71 
These positive and tremendous developments in international criminal law, 
from the end of WW I to the ad hoc tribunals of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
culminated in the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court. 
 
2.8 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The ICC was established by the adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.72 In total 120 States voted for the adoption of the 
Rome Statute, 21 abstentions, and 7 States including the United States of 
America (USA), voted against its adoption.73 Thus following a protracted 
process, from the aftermath of WW I to the establishment of the ad hoc 
tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, the international community under the auspices of 
the UN succeeded in establishing the permanent International Criminal Court. 
The ICC was therefore established, ‘to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for 
the most serious crimes of international concern, and be complementary to 
                                                            
70 ICTR Statute, Art. 3. 
71 Kittichaisaree (2001:27). 
72 Adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002 -UN. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 
(1998), 37 I.L.M 999. 
73 Vigorito (2002:93). 
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national criminal jurisdictions.’74 The most serious crimes of international 
concern over which the ICC has jurisdiction, have been specified as the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression.75 These crimes have their basis in the Nuremberg Charter. 
However, the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, 
once it has been properly and agreeably defined and a provision adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 of the Statute.76 In practice therefore, the 
ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. Deriving its lessons from the Nuremberg Charter, 
Tokyo Charter and the ad hoc tribunals of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 
Rome Statute has tremendously tried to address and resolve some contentious 
issues under international criminal law. In that regard, the ICC will ‘only have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed after entry into force of its Statute.’77 This is 
further re-enforced by the provision stipulating that, ‘no person shall be 
criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force 
of the Statute.’78 Furthermore, ‘a person shall not be criminally responsible 
under the Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes 
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the court.’79 In reality therefore, the 
criticisms leveled against the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo Tribunal of 
applying ex post facto law cannot apply to the ICC. The nullum crimen sine lege  
principle has therefore been accommodated in the Statute. No person can be 
                                                            
74 Rome Statute, Art.1. 
75 Rome Statute, Art.5 (1). 
76 Rome Statute, Art.5 (2). 
77 Rome Statute, Art.11. 
78 Rome Statute, Art. 24(1). 
79 Rome Statute, Art. 22. 
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prosecuted before the ICC for conduct which did not constitute a crime at the 
time it was committed. Similarly the nulla poena sine lege has been taken care 
of in that ‘a person convicted by the court may be punished in accordance with 
this Statute.’ A person cannot be punished therefore for conduct which does not 
constitute an offence under the Statute. 
As earlier indicated the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national 
jurisdictions. The Rome Statute thus recognizes that ‘the effective prosecution 
of the most serious crimes to the international community as a whole must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing 
international cooperation, and that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.’80 Hence 
State Parties have obligations under the Rome Statute to bring to fruition the 
aspirations of the international community as enunciated in the Rome Statute. 
There are several ways or modes of implementing the Rome Statute as 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four of this paper. However Africa through 
individual countries and the AU seem to have doubts on the international nature 
and character of the ICC. 
 
2.9 Africa’s Ambivalence Towards the ICC 
African countries highly participated and contributed to the adoption of the 
Rome Statute. About ‘47 African countries were involved in the drafting of the 
                                                            
80 Rome Statute, preamble paragraphs 4 & 6. 
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Rome Statute, and the vast majority voted for the adoption of the Rome Statute 
and the establishing of the ICC.’81 This signifies the overwhelming support of 
the African countries for the adoption of the Rome Statute and the 
establishment of the ICC. ‘Thirty (30) African countries have ratified the Rome 
Statute and are members of the ICC.’82 And ‘to demonstrate Africa’s 
commitment to the ICC approximately twenty (20) African countries have draft 
or final implementing legislation which incorporates crimes listed under the 
Rome Statute.’83 What the triggered the conflicting views emanating from the 
AU on the ICC? It needs to be taken into consideration too that African 
situations currently under the ICC were actually government referrals; situation 
in Uganda concerning the Lords Resistant Army, the situation in Central African 
Republic, and the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Situations in 
Darfur and Kenya were referred by the UN Security Council. It can therefore, be 
safely concluded, that the main concern for the AU is the issue concerning the 
President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir and the ICC, following a referral by the UN 
Security Council. 
 
2.9.1 ICC Warrant of Arrest for Omar al Bashir  
On 4 March 2009 the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued an arrest warrant 
against al Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity.84 A second 
                                                            
81 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2010). 
82 The Review of the Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court (2010:3). 
83 The Review of the Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court (2010:3). 
84 Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09. 
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arrest warrant against al Bashir was issued on 12 July 2010, for genocide.85 
This is presumably the first time the ICC has ever issued an arrest warrant 
against a sitting Head of State. Al Bashir is the current President of Sudan. And 
Sudan is a Member State of the AU. The response of the AU in condemning 
the ICC for the issuance of these arrest warrants has been swift. This despite 
the overwhelming support of African countries for the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, and the subsequent ratifications of the Statute by a number of African 
States. This is a major test for the applicability of the Rome Statute in African 
countries. However, the action by the ICC demonstrates that the fight against 
impunity will not discriminate basing on one’s official position as Head of State, 
no one is above the law. However, in the wake of criticisms from the AU, the 
practicability of implementation of the arrest warrant on African soil, and the 
prosecution of Al Bashir, might prove illusive. This paper, discusses this 
standstill, with reference to how it might negatively affect the implementation of 
the Rome Statute. 
 
2.9.2 AU’s Uncompromising Stand 
As earlier observed, African countries overwhelmingly voted for the adoption of 
the Rome Statute, and some of them have already domesticated it, while others 
are in the process of domesticating it. That support signified that they 
wholeheartedly endorsed its applicability. Yet the indictment of Al Bashir by the 
ICC is sending out a negative sign from African countries through the AU. The 
                                                            
85 Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09. 
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current Chairman of the AU, President Bingu wa Mutharika, President of 
Malawi, summed up the AU’s view, stating that ‘the indictments against Omar al 
Bashir are undermining solidarity, peace and security in the region, and that the 
ICC’s arrest warrant is a violation of the principles of sovereignty.’86 Yet the 
Rome Statute stipulates that the States Parties ‘are determined to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes,’87and further ‘that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.’88 It thus puts into 
question, the commitment shown by African countries in the adoption of the 
Rome Statute. However the AU has tried to tone down its criticism of the ICC 
by contending through its envoy to the United Nations, Tete Antonio, that ‘the 
AU  in reguesting deferment of the prosecution is in no way condoning 
impunity, and that it is imperative to bring to justice  the perpetrators of gross 
human rights abuse in that region.has.’89 The AU’s argument then, seems to 
suggest that at this time peace in Darfur is more important than justice. But 
what if despite efforts of all those concerned, the cores crimes continue to be 
committed by government forces in Sudan? What will be the image of the ICC if 
it starts delving into political debates and discussions warranting political 
solutions? Its independence will likely be compromised and it such lose the 
trust and confidence of those who support it. The ICC of course finds itself in a 
                                                            
86 PressTV: JR/AKM (2010:1). 
87 Rome Statute, para. 5 of preamble. 
88 Rome Statute, para. 6 of preamble. 
89 Lederer (2010). 
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precarious position considering that, the UN Security Council, which is for all 
purposes highly political, referred the matter to the ICC. Thereby, the ICC finds 
itself drawn into a political tussle between the AU and the UN Security Council.  
The AU and some African countries, have defied the ICC on the arrest warrants 
against al Bashir, claiming that the ICC only targets Africans in its investigations 
and prosecutions. The AU has further asked the ICC to invoke Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute and defer investigations and prosecution of al Bashir. President 
Bingu wa Mutharika stated thus, ‘we have decided to establish our own 
mechanism, we are asking the United Nations to suspend for a period of twelve 
months the arrest warrants against al Bashir.’90 He went on to question the 
mandate of the ICC to try Sudan stating ‘Let us look at the position of the ICC, 
do they have a right to try Sudan which is not a member of the ICC? I think it is 
something we have to look at.’91 These might be legitimate concerns, but have 
the capacity to derail the work of the ICC and at the same time be viewed as 
condoning impunity by Heads of States, thereby undermining international 
criminal law. This might further derail the application of the Rome Statute, 
which heavily envisages the ICC relying on cooperation of States Parties to 
enable it achieve its mandate. Despite the AU’s call against the arrest warrants 
other African States are willing to enforce the arrest warrants and effect the 
arrest of al Bashir. The South African President, Jacob Zuma, when asked in 
Parliament about al Bashir visiting South Africa for the FIFA World Cup 2010, 
he bravely stated that al Bashir would be arrested, reiterating that ‘South Africa 
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31 
 
 
 
respects the international law and certainly we are signatories and we abide by 
the law.’92This is what would be expected of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute. 
The obligations imposed on States Parties by the Rome Statute, entails 
cooperation of States Parties with the ICC. If the AU had the political will to 
enhance the effectiveness of the ICC, they would make sure that the arrest 
warrant was enforced, just as South Africa would have done. Claiming that they 
do not condone impunity while acting differently, will only undermine the 
authority of the ICC and the investigations and prosecution of perpetrators of 
the core crimes. The AU would have advanced the aspirations of the ICC by 
forcing al Bashir to step down as President of Sudan, and defend himself 
before the ICC. In that regard the AU would show its adherence to tenets of 
international law, and the Rome Statute, in particular, and its quest to do away 
with impunity even of Heads of States.  
 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
The evolution of international criminal law demonstrates that individuals, and 
not States, are now the concern of international criminal law. Individuals who 
commit core crimes, crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, will be held criminally responsible. Thus, individual perpetrators of 
these crimes cannot hide under the principle of State sovereignty, as 
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prosecution of these crimes knows no boundaries. International criminal law 
shows that impunity will no longer be tolerated. The adoption of the Rome 
Statute, and the establishment of the ICC, confirms the international 
communities distate of those individuals who commit these crimes. The 
indictment of Omar al Bashir, a sitting President, is the ultimate demonstration 
of the judicial independence of the ICC. The AU must demonstrate by deed not 
words that it respects international law, by respecting the ICC’s decision to 
indict al Bashir. The Rome Statute and the ICC are now part of the international 
criminal justice system.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ROME STATUTE IN NATIONAL 
JURISDICTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
As has already been discussed in this paper, on 17 July 1998 120 States voted 
for the adoption of the Rome Statue. ‘With the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute in July 2002 and election of judges and Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court in 2003, there is need for State Parties to the Rome Statute to 
enact implementing legislation to domesticate the crimes defined in the 
treaty.’93This is so because State Parties having ratified the Rome Statute, are 
under obligations to implement the aspirations of the Statute since the ‘success 
of the ICC will depend not only on wide spread ratifications of the Rome 
Statute, but also state parties full compliance with their obligations under it.’94 
Although the Rome Statute ‘does not oblige the states to enact domestic 
legislation pursuant to the Statute’s prescriptions it encourages them to do 
so.’95 It is accepted, though, that implementation of the Rome Statute in 
national/domestic jurisdictions is very essential but will depend on the legal 
system of each particular state and mainly what the constitution of a particular 
state stipulates. It has thus been observed that ‘the experience of most state 
parties to the treaty is that the Rome Statute will require some form of domestic 
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implementing legislation, even if this is not the practice of the State.’96 However 
the primary message of the Rome Statute as regards the quality of domestic 
criminal legislation is that states should be both willing and able (through their 
domestic legislation) to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes in a capacity similar to that of the International Criminal Court.’97 
Measures to ensure implementation of law and the Rome Statute, in particular 
are paramount.98 It is therefore paramount that domestic criminal law be in 
consonant with the Rome Statute. There are well accepted though different 
modes of domesticating or implementing international law and treaties in 
national jurisdictions. 
Implicit in these different modes of domestication are the monistic and dualist 
theories of implementing international law in national jurisdictions. The monistic 
theory ‘propounded by an Austrian H. Kelsen presupposes that there exists a 
unitary legal system, embracing all the various legal orders operating at various 
levels; and that international law is at the top of the pyramid and validates or 
invalidates all the legal acts of any other legal system.’99 In essence this theory 
envisages that ‘municipal law/national law must always conform to international 
law, and that where there is conflict between the two, the latter must prevail, 
and further that it is not necessary to transform international norms into 
national/municipal law.’100 On the other hand the dualist theory/approach 
envisages that international law and municipal legal systems constitute two 
                                                            
96 Olugbuo (2003:1). 
97 Werle (2009:118). 
98 McCoubrey (1998:57). 
99 Cassese (2005:215). 
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distinct and formally separate categories of legal orders.’101 In that regard this 
theory argues that the differences between these two legal systems are thus: 
‘the subjects of domestic legal systems are individuals and groups of 
individuals, whereas in case of international law are states; sources of 
domestic/municipal law are parliamentary statutes or judge-made law, while 
treaties and custom are the two principal law-creating processes in international 
law; and national law regulates the internal functioning of the State and the 
relations between States and individuals, whereas international law chiefly 
governs relations between sovereign States.’102 This theory therefore still 
perceives individuals as the exclusive domain of municipal law, and States as 
the exclusive domain of States. This paper therefore addresses the different 
modes of implementing international law in national jurisdictions from these 
theories perspective while at the same time, as this paper has earlier argued, 
keeping in mind that international criminal law has evolved to the point that it 
directly applies to individuals especially those who commit international crimes. 
It must be noted that different terminology has been employed to explain the 
same modes of implementation of international law in national jurisdiction, 
however this paper discusses these as follows: automatic standing 
incorporation and legislative ad hoc incorporation. 
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3.2 Automatic Standing Incorporation 
Under this mode of  incorporation of international rules, incorporation ‘occurs 
whenever the national constitution, or law (or, in the case of judge-made law, 
judicial decisions) enjoin that all State officials as well as nationals and other 
individuals living on the territory of the State are bound to apply certain present 
or future rules of international law.’103 In other States, this mode of incorporation 
is what is fulfilled where international rules or treaties become domestic law just 
by virtue of ratification.104 In essence ‘an internal norm or law, most often times 
a constitutional provision provides in a permanent way for the automatic 
incorporation into national law of any rule of international law more especially 
customary international law or even treaties.’105 However in respect of treaties, 
this mode is only applicable in respect ‘of treaties which are self-executing, that 
is, those treaties which require no intervention by the legislature in order to 
determine how the obligations under the treaties are to be carried into effect, 
that is, they have the force of law without the need for legislation to make them 
part of municipal law.’106 As regards non-self executing treaties, there is always 
a need or requirement for implementing legislation in order to make them 
applicable in domestic jurisdictions, that is, to make them applicable by the 
courts.107 In the The USA, for instance, the constitution stipulates that treaties 
made under the authority of the USA form part of the supreme law of the 
                                                            
103 Cassese (2005:220). 
104 Thamilmaran (1999:2). 
105 Cassese (2005:220). 
106 Feldman (1999:4). 
107 Thamilmaran (1999:4). 
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land.108In that regard the courts inter alia are under an obligation to apply such 
treaties in their decisions. However it must be noted that for a treaty or 
international agreement to be ratified by the US President, the President must 
have first submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent by a two-thirds 
vote.’109 It is upon attaining the two-thirds vote that the President may ratify the 
international agreement/treaty, but he is under no obligation to do so, as he 
may decline to ratify the treaty.110 Once ratified, it becomes the supreme law of 
the land and US courts are under an obligation to apply it. However it must still 
be noted that the US President can derive authority straight from the 
constitution and ratify treaties and international agreements without the 
involvement of congress.111 In other jurisdictions international law becomes part 
of municipal law through legislative ad hoc incorporation. 
 
3.3 Legislative Ad Hoc Incorporation 
Under this mode of implementation, international law other than international 
customary law, can only become part of national or municipal law upon 
legislative action. In that regard ‘the provisions of ratified treaties do not 
become national law unless they have been enacted as legislation by normal 
                                                            
108 The Constitution of the United States, Art. VI :’This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding….’( online at: 
http://72.32.50.200/constitution/constitution.pdf -accessed on 20.05.2010). 
109 Slyz (1995-1996:8). 
110 Slyz (1995-1996:9). 
111 Slyz (1995-1996:10). 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
method, and the legislative act creating the norms as domestic law is an act 
entirely distinct from the act of ratification of the treaty.’112 In other jurisdictions, 
‘this method is just referred to as ‘legislative incorporation’ and is used for 
example in the UK, Commonwealth countries, and Scandinavian countries.’113 
This method therefore ‘differs from a jurisdiction where ratified treaties become 
domestic/municipal law just by virtue of ratification, that is, automatic standing 
incorporation or automatic incorporation.’114 It must however be borne in mind 
as already observed, that even in jurisdictions where treaties become part of 
municipal/domestic law by virtue of ratification, this is only applicable to what 
are self-executing treaties, whereas for non-self-executing treaties or 
provisions, enabling legislation must be passed to make them part of 
domestic/municipal law. Implementing domestic legislation where required, 
‘may consist of two principal forms: firstly the legislation may consist of an act 
of parliament translating the various treaty provisions, powers, and rights 
stemming from those international provisions (statutory ad hoc incorporation of 
international rules ); secondly, the act of parliament may confine itself to 
enjoining the automatic applicability of the international rule within the national 
legal system, without formulating that rule ad hoc (automatic ad hoc 
incorporation of international law ).’115 The generality of the applicability of 
treaties in the national jurisdiction is thus curtailed in that incorporation is 
effected on a case by case basis.’116 Despite these differences in approach, the 
                                                            
112 Thamilmaran (1999:2). 
113 Thamilmaran (1999:2). 
114 Thamilmaran (1999:3). 
115 Cassese (2005:221). 
116 Cassese (2005:221). 
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end result is the same, that is, the treaties in question will have the same force 
of law in the national jurisdiction. What matters is the legislative act of 
incorporating the treaties into municipal law, hence the courts or any other 
public bodies can now apply the provisions of the treaties just as any other 
municipal law. 
It is thus clear that self-executing treaties become part of municipal law just by 
an act of ratification, whereas non-self-executing treaties will always require an 
act of legislation to make them part of municipal law. Similarly customary 
international law in most States become directly applicable as municipal law as 
provided in the constitutions of those States. The different mechanisms of 
applicability of international law have thus been adequately summarized in 
relation to Scandinavian countries as follows: ‘Whereas in some countries, 
either by virtue of a provision in the Constitution or by virtue of customary 
constitutional law, international agreements automatically become part of the 
international legal system as soon as they have been ratified and published, it 
is a longstanding practice in Sweden as well as in other Scandinavian countries 
that international agreements cannot be applied by national courts or other 
authorities unless they have been incorporated into the national legal system by 
a particular legislative act. Thus, if the existing legislation does not contain any 
rules equivalent to the provisions of the agreement, or where the rules of the 
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national law are in conflict with these provisions, the national law has to be 
supplemented or amended.’117 
 It is therefore very important that States should have clarity in their legal 
systems, most importantly in their constitutions as to how international law is to 
be applied in their jurisdictions. In the event that this is not clarified, there is 
likely to be a tag-of-war as to whether to apply international law or municipal 
law when certain international law issues arise. In that respect this paper 
argues that in the case of Malawi and applicability of international law, in 
particular, the Rome Statute, there is need for enabling legislation to 
domesticate it. 
 
3.4 Non-Incorporation 
Under this option, States can decide just ‘to use their ordinary criminal law to 
cover crimes under international law adequately, for example under the 
definitions of murder, deprivation of liberty, and the like.’118In this regard, the 
core crimes will in essence, be investigated and prosecuted just like ordinary 
crimes. Following this route of non-incorporation will create confusion and 
uncertainty in that it might be discovered that the punishments under ordinary 
criminal law might not be adequate enough for the core crimes.119Furthermore 
the offences under ordinary criminal law might not capture clearly and 
                                                            
117 Sperduti (1977:47), quoting Summary of a report by a Governmental Committee entitled in 
Swedish: Internationella Overenskommelser och Svensk ratt  ( English translation ‘International 
Treaties and Swedish law’), SOU 1974, 100. 
118 Werle (2009:120). 
119 Werle (2009:120). 
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adequately the magnitude and gravity of the core crime,120 and this might lead 
to a dilution of the seriousness of the core crimes. It has however been argued 
that where there is inadequacy in the ordinary criminal law, that will possibly 
result in the ICC assuming jurisdiction and prosecuting those crimes as 
stipulated in the Rome Statute.121 That would definitely be an indication of the 
State’s inability to investigate and prosecute those core crimes. However, it has 
further been argued that though non-incorporation is an option, ‘to comply fully 
with the spirit and plan of the Rome Statute, States should adapt their 
substantive criminal law.’122 Incorporation of the Rome Statute into municipal 
law is therefore, a preferred option. Several States Parties to the Rome Statute 
have domesticated the Statute, and others are in the process of so doing. 
Malawi would therefore benefit by emulating the examples of such States. 
3.5  Rome Statute Implementation in Some States 
Other States Parties to the Rome Statute have already implemented the 
Statute into their municipal laws. The domestication of the Statute therefore 
makes it applicable in those States, as municipal law. These States have 
therefore established jurisdiction over the core crimes as provided for in the 
Rome Statute. For purposes of this paper, the discussion is restricted to 
implementation of the Rome Statute in South Africa, Kenya, New Zealand and 
England. 
 
                                                            
120 Hay (2004:193). 
121 Werle (2009:120). 
122 Werle (2009:121). 
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3.5.1  Rome Statute in South Africa 
South Africa was one of the so called ‘like-minded nations at the Rome 
Conference in 1998 who supported the creation of the ICC, and on 18 July 
1998 the South African Parliament passed the Implementation of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (the ICC Act).’123 The introduction to 
the ICC Act demonstrates South Africa’s commitment in creating a legal 
framework for the full implementation of the Rome Statute, as regards providing 
for the core crimes, prosecution of persons committing these crimes within and 
outside South Africa, surrender of such persons to the ICC, and all other 
cooperation requirements with the ICC.124 Worth noting is that South Africa 
decided to implement the Rome Statute through legislative ad hoc 
incorporation. Ratification alone was not sufficient, but incorporation through 
legislation. In that regard South Africa made sure that the expectations and 
aspirations of the Rome Statute are adequately met. In Chapter One, the ICC 
Act further reiterates the objects of the Act as being, inter alia, ‘to ensure that 
the Statute is effectively implemented in the Republic; to ensure that anything 
done in this Act conforms with the obligations of the Republic in terms of the 
Statute; to provide for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, and in the event of the national prosecuting authority declining or being 
                                                            
123 Du Plessis (2003:1). 
124 To provide for a framework to ensure the effective implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC in South Africa; to ensure that South Africa conforms with its obligations set out in the 
Statute, to provide for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; to 
provide for the prosecution in South African courts of persons accused of having committed the 
said crimes in South Africa and beyond the borders of South Africa in certain circumstances; to 
provide for the arrest of persons accused of having committed the said crimes and their 
surrender to the said Court in certain circumstances; to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
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unable to prosecute a person contemplated in paragraph (d), to enable the 
Republic to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of 
persons accused of having committed crimes or offences referred to in the 
Statute, and in particular to- (i) enable the  Court to make requests for 
assistance; (ii) provide mechanisms for the surrender to the Court of persons 
accused of having committed a crime referred to in the Statute; (iii) enable the 
Court to sit in the Republic; and (iv) enforce any sentence or order made by the 
Court.’125 Furthermore, South Africa inserted an all inclusive provision in the 
ICC Act, to make sure that any weakness in drafting the Act, does not 
compromise the full application of the Rome Statute. The ICC Act thus provides 
that, ‘In addition to the Constitution and the law, any competent court in the 
Republic hearing a matter arising from the application of this Act must also 
consider, and where, appropriate, may apply –(a) conventional international 
law, and in particular the Statute (emphasis added); (b) customary international 
law; and (c) comparable foreign law.’126  
In essence therefore the ICC Act has attempted to a great extent to cover fully 
South Africa’s obligations under the Rome Statute. One significant aspect of 
the ICC Act is its provision on the question of immunity from prosecution. The 
ICC Act provides that, ‘notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, including 
customary and conventional international law, the fact that a person…..is or 
was a Head of State or Government, a member of a government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a government official….is neither –(i) a defence to 
                                                            
125 Implementation of the International Criminal Court Act, s. 3 (a)-(e). 
126 Implementation of the International Criminal Court Act, s. 2. 
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a crime; nor (ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person 
has been convicted of a crime.’127 There is no doubt, therefore, that no one 
accused of these crimes will enjoy immunity in South Africa. This provision 
mirrors mutatis mutandis Article 27 of the Rome Statute. Official capacity of a 
person is therefore, not a bar to prosecution before both the ICC and South 
African courts. Du Plessis has hailed this ICC Act provision as ‘a significant 
aspect of the ICC Act and one which is to be welcomed, signaling as it does 
South Africa’s intention of acting hand in hand with the International Criminal 
Court to bring government officials, whatever their standing, to justice.’128 The 
ICC Act has further entrenched provisions regarding cooperation with the ICC 
relating to investigations and prosecutions, enforcement of ICC sentences, 
confiscation orders, and various aspects of cooperation required. And as 
regards substantive law, the ICC Act has adopted wholesale the wording of the 
Rome Statute as regards the core crimes. 
All in all, the implementation of the Rome Statute, by legislation, demonstrates 
South Africa’s commitment to fully abide by the Rome Statute. The fact that the 
South African President had indicated that al Bashir would be arrested, if he 
came to South Africa, further demonstrates that applicability of the Rome 
Statute can be further achieved, by legislation coupled with political will. 
 
 
                                                            
127 Implementation of the International Criminal Court Act, s. 4 (2)(a). 
128 Du Plessis (2003:7). 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
3.5.2  Rome Statute in the UK 
The experience of UK in implementing the Rome Statute is quite unique. UK 
first passed the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (ICC Act), which came 
into force on 1 September 2001, for the implementation of the Rome Statute in 
England and Wales, and Northern Ireland before ratifying the Rome 
Statute.129The purport of the Act is ‘to give effect to the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court; to provide for offences under the law of England 
and Wales and Northern Ireland corresponding to offences within the 
jurisdiction of that Court, and for connected purposes.’130 It has further been 
observed that the ICC  Act has two major purposes, ‘to ensure that the UK is 
able to cooperate fully with the ICC, and to enact into domestic law the 
substantive offences, that is genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, the ICC may assert jurisdiction over when it comes into being.’131 The 
ICC Act has thus made its provisions in line with the Rome Statute in all 
aspects, that is, relating to incorporation of the core crimes, investigations and 
prosecutions of the core crimes, cooperation with the ICC, and all other 
incidental procedural matters connected thereto, which makes the full 
implementation of the Rome Statute a reality in the UK. There are inevitably 
issues which need to be highlighted. 
                                                            
129 Warbrick (2002:734). 
130 International Criminal Court Act, preamble. 
131 Warbrick (2002:734). 
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The ICC Act deals differently with the issue of immunity of persons who are 
nationals of a State Party and a non-State Party to the Rome Statute.132 In case 
on non-State Parties, the ICC would be required to obtain a waiver of immunity 
from the state concerned,133whereas in case of State Parties there is no 
requirement of a waiver as that is consistent with Article 27 of the Rome 
Statute. And commenting on non requirement of express waiver for States 
Parties in the ICC Act, Warbrick concedes that this is justified ‘for having ratified 
an instrument creating a court to prosecute international crimes, and in front of 
which no immunities may be pleaded, it would seem inconsistent for a State to 
assert that its immunities prevent surrender.’134 Warbrick further quotes Lord 
Averbury who buttressed the point stating that ‘in accepting Article 27, a State 
Party to the ICC Statute has already agreed that immunity of its 
representatives, including its Head of State, may be waived before the 
International Criminal Court and that their status is not a barrier to their arrest 
and surrender to the Court. A non-State Party to the ICC Statute has not 
accepted that provision [Art. 27] and the immunity of their diplomats remains 
                                                            
132 Section 23 of the Act stipulates: (1) Any state or diplomatic immunity attaching to a person 
by reason of a connection with a state party to the ICC Statute does not prevent proceedings 
under this Part in relation to that person; (2) where –(a) state or diplomatic immunity attaches to 
a person by reason of a connection with a state party to the ICC Statute, and (a) waiver of that 
immunity is obtained by the ICC in relation to that persons surrender, the waiver shall be 
treated as extending to proceedings under this Part in connection with that request; (3) a 
certificate by the Secretary of State (a) that a state is or is not a party to the ICC Statute, or (b) 
that there has been such a waiver as is mentioned in subsection (2), is conclusive evidence of 
that fact for purposes of this Part; (4) the Secretary of State may, after any consultation with the 
ICC and the state concerned, direct that proceedings (or further proceedings) under this Part 
which, but for subsection (1) or (2), would be prevented by state or diplomatic immunity 
attaching a person shall not be taken against that person. 
133 Rome Statute, Art. 98 (1). 
134 Warbrick (2002:738). 
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intact unless there is an express waiver.’135 It is thus clear that in implementing 
the Rome Statute, issues of immunity must be carefully and critically addressed 
as failure so to do, might compromise the applicability of the Rome Statute, and 
hence derail the investigation and prosecution of these core crimes. To avoid 
this kind of uncertainty the South African ICC Act just provided a general 
provision whose effect is that there shall be no immunity for these core crimes. 
It is acceptable that each State will have different approaches to 
implementation of the Rome Statute, but what is critical is that the purport and 
spirit of the Rome Statute must not be lost in whatever legislation style is 
adopted and used. The primary aim should be to effectively realign the 
municipal law to the objects of the Rome Statute, and thereby establishing 
national or domestic jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute core crimes. 
Hence the realization by UK of the weakness of its domestic legislation in 
covering international crimes was also an incentive for domesticating the Rome 
Statute.136 Therefore the UK had ‘to incorporate the core crimes or ICC crimes 
into domestic law, in order to avail itself to the complementarity provisions 
under the Rome Statute, and thereby be able to investigate and prosecute the 
core crimes itself.’137The ICC Act therefore provides for the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, and defines these crimes by 
reference to the definitions in the Rome Statute.138 In this regard, the ICC Act 
fully incorporates these crimes without diluting their effect by redrafting them. 
                                                            
135 Warbrick (2002:738). 
136 Warbrick (2002:739). 
137 Warbrick (2002:739). 
138 International Criminal Court Act, s. 50. 
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The elements of these crimes are thus captured by the ICC Act. By thus, 
incorporating the Rome Statute by legislation, the UK has demonstrated its 
commitment to upholding the rules of international criminal law, and the Rome 
Statute, in particular. 
 
3.5.3 Rome Statute in New Zealand 
New Zealand ratified the Rome Statute on 7 September 2000 becoming the 
17th State to ratify the Statute.139 This is so because under the New Zealand 
legal system, before treaty action is taken, Cabinet must approve, and then the 
treaty is tabled before a Parliamentary select committee and then legislation is 
passed before New Zealand can become a party.140 The approach in New 
Zealand is similar to that in the UK, in that implementation legislation, in the 
form of the International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act), 
was enacted before ratification of the Rome Statute.141 Another unique feature 
was that New Zealand, ‘due to its territorial jurisdiction, could not prosecute its 
citizen who committed, for example, genocide, outside New Zealand if it did not 
incorporate the core crimes and even amend its Crimes Act.’142 It was therefore 
prudent to adopt the core crimes as provided for in the Rome Statute. In that 
regard, New Zealand would establish and did establish jurisdiction to prosecute 
the core crimes. The ICC Act thus adopts the approach of defining the crime of 
                                                            
139 Hay (2004:191). 
140 Hay (2004:192). 
141 The Act was assented to on 6 September 2000, came into force on 1 October 2000 (as per 
section 2). 
142 Hay (2004:192). 
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genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes by reference to the Rome 
Statute.143Furthermore, the general principles of criminal law emanating from 
the Rome Statute, have been incorporated in the ICC Act by reference to the 
Articles in the Rome Statute.144 
Under New Zealand legal system there is no supreme law governing 
immunities, and as such complexities might arise under the ICC Act, only 
where a foreign national with immunity status is being prosecuted.145 However 
this difficulty might be cured by the ICC assuming jurisdiction over the matter, 
and seeking a waiver of the immunity, and surrender of the individual to the ICC 
under Article 97 of the Rome Statute. Otherwise the ICC Act has endeavored to 
as much as possible replicate the Rome Statute under municipal law. It has 
also provided for procedural issues relating to cooperation with the ICC as 
envisaged in the Rome Statute. The ICC Act has further criminalized conduct 
relating to corruption and bribery of an official of ICC, giving false evidence on 
matters relating to the ICC, fabricating evidence before the ICC, conspiracy to 
defeat justice in ICC and interference with witnesses or officials in relation to 
ICC matters.146 This innovation of including new offences in the ICC Act is 
encouraging and enhances New Zealand’s commitment to fully realize the 
objects of the Rome Statute within its jurisdiction. Thus New Zealand, just like 
the UK and South Africa, has demonstrated that despite the Rome Statute 
                                                            
143 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act, s. 9-11. 
144 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act, s. 12. 
145 Hay (2004:198). 
146 International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act, s. 17-21. 
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imposing no obligations for the domestication of the Statute, it is advantageous 
so to do, if the objects of the Statute are to be realized. 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
There are various modes of implementing international law and international 
agreements in national jurisdictions. National jurisdictions appear hesitant, 
despite their constitutional provisions, to apply customary international law. 
Clarity is only achieved with regard to applicability of international law and 
international agreements, through legislative process. For the Rome Statute to 
be effectively domesticated, municipal legislation to that effect is the key. The 
true nature of the substantive criminal law in the Rome Statute must not be 
bypassed in domesticating the Rome Statute. State Parties must also exercise 
their flexibility, as New Zealand has demonstrated, to include other crimes in 
their municipal law which have the objective of enhancing the objectives of the 
Rome Statute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DOMESTICATION OF THE ROME STATUTE IN MALAWI 
4.1 Introduction 
The Republic of Malawi (Malawi) ratified the Rome Statute on 19 September 
2002.147 As a result of the ratification Malawi just as other States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, has obligations to bring to fruition the aspirations of the Rome 
Statute. As has already been alluded to in this paper, the ICC was established 
‘to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern, and shall be complementary to national jurisdictions.’148 In that regard, 
it is envisaged that national courts shall remain the first port of call as regards 
the prosecution of these most serious crimes, that is, the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.149 The 
principle of complementarity of the ICC thus ‘denotes that the court is only to 
exercise its jurisdiction if States remain whollly inactive vis-à-vis ICC crimes or, 
in case States investigate prosecute and adjudicate cases, if they prove to be 
unwilling or unable to do so genuinely.’150 Malawi is therefore under an 
obligation to contribute to the effectiveness of the ICC by prosecuting ICC 
crimes in its national courts. This paper therefore argues that Malawi must 
incorporate the Rome Statute into its national laws and thereby create legal 
certainty as regards the suppression of these ICC crimes. This will inevitably 
                                                            
147 Making the International Criminal Court Work: A Handbook for Implementing the Rome 
Statute (2001:3). 
148 Rome Statute, Art. 1. 
149 Rome Statute, Art. 5. 
150 Kleffner (2008:4). 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
depend on the constitutional provisions in Malawi, as well as amendment of 
other laws which might run counter to the aspirations of the Rome Statute. An 
understanding of how Malawi can implement the Rome Statute in her 
jurisdiction would be futile without understanding inter alia the constitutional 
order and the legal system in Malawi, how Malawi implements international 
agreements, experiences of other States in implementation of the Rome 
Statute, and the procedural issues as regards cooperation with the ICC. 
 
4.2 Malawi Legal System  
Malawi was formerly a British Protectorate and therefore follows the English 
common law and is a dualist system. This is so because of the historical 
background of Malawi. On 14 May 1891 Malawi was proclaimed a British 
Protectorate under the Africa Order-in-Council of 1889.151 In 1907 the 
Nyasaland Order-in-Council was adopted, and under this Constitution, the 
name of the protectorate changed from British Central Africa to Nyasaland.152 
On 6 July 1964 Malawi attained independence status and assumed a new 
name, Malawi; and on 6 July 1966 became the Republic of Malawi.153 The 
Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1966 vested in the president absolute 
executive authority and power,154 and created a one-party State with the 
                                                            
151 Hara (2007:5). 
152 Hara (2007:5). 
153 Chirwa et al (2005:4). 
154 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1966, s.8(1). 
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Malawi Congress Party as the only party on the land.155 However, as regards 
international law the constitution provided that ‘the Government and the people 
of Malawi shall continue to recognize the sanctity of the personal liberties 
enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of 
adherence to the Law of Nations.’156  (Emphasis added). This was a recognition 
of international law and adherence to it, though the provision fell short of 
providing the effect and applicability of international law in Malawi. However 
practice showed that international law, especially treaties had to be ratified and 
incorporated into domestic law. 
Eventually Malawi did away with dictatorship and became a multi-party State 
with the adoption of an interim constitution on 18 May 1994 which became the 
substantive constitution on 18 May 1995.157 The supremacy of the constitution 
is one of its underlying values, whose essence is that the three organs of State, 
the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary are all subordinate to the 
constitution and are bound by its provisions.158 Hence all laws derive their 
authority from the constitution and ‘any law contrary to or inconsistent with the 
provisions of the constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
invalid.’159It is therefore from this constitutional background that the 
implementation of the Rome Statute in Malawi has to be discussed. 
 
                                                            
155 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1966, s.4 (1), (2). 
156 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1966, s.2(1)(iii). 
157 Chigawa (2006:12). 
158 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, ss. 4 & 5. 
159 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, s.5. 
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4.3 International Law in Malawi 
As has been demonstrated the supreme law in Malawi is the constitution. It 
guides all organs of State in the conduct of their affairs and affairs of State. It 
thus provides for the status of international law, international agreements and 
treaties in the Malawi legal system. The constitution envisages three scenarios 
of applicability of international agreements and international law in Malawi. That 
is, any international agreement entered into after the commencement of the 
constitution shall form part of the law of the Republic if so provided by or under 
an Act of Parliament;160 binding international agreements entered into before 
the commencement of this constitution shall, continue to bind the Republic 
unless otherwise provided by an Act of Parliament;161 and customary 
international law, unless inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of 
Parliament, shall form part of the law of the Republic.162 The scenario as 
envisaged by the constitution is that international agreements can only be 
implemented through national legislation or legislative incorporation, or in case 
of customary international law, as long as it is not in conflict with the 
constitution or an Act of Parliament. It is quite obvious, therefore, that 
ratification only of an international agreement is not enough for the said 
international agreement to be part of the domestic/municipal law in Malawi. 
However as regards international agreements entered into before 
commencement of this constitution, it seems like the constitution envisages a 
scenario where those agreements would be law in Malawi without any 
                                                            
160 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, s.211 (1). 
161 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, s.211 (2). 
162 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, s.211 (3). 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
legislative action. This would definitely create a problem of applicability in 
Malawi as the mechanism of its applicability is not clearly defined. 
 
4.3.1 Court Decisions 
The court hierarchy in Malawi comprises of the Magistrates courts (subordinate 
courts),163 the High Court of Malawi (HC)164 and the Malawi Supreme Court of 
Appeal (MSCA).165The subordinate courts have limited criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High Court and is 
the highest appellate court in Malawi.166 The decisions of the MSCA are 
therefore final and depict the position of the law in Malawi. The decisions of the 
HC unless reversed by the HC will also depict the position of the law in Malawi. 
The interpretation of the constitution, statutes and the applicability of 
international law rest with the HC and the MSCA. Thus the focus of this paper 
as regards applicability of international law and international agreements in 
Malawi is limited to the HC and the MSCA as opposed to the magistrates 
courts.   
 
 
                                                            
163 Republic of Malawi Constitution, 1995, s.110. 
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4.3.1.1 High Court Decisions 
The HC in Malawi has, however, dating back from the time of the 1966 
constitution grappled with the applicability of international law where it is seen 
to be inconsistent or in conflict with the constitution or any domestic law. The 
HC has generally interpreted such international agreements to be inapplicable 
in Malawi if they are found to be inconsistent with the constitution. In the case 
of Gondwe v Attorney General167 the plaintiff’s action was for the recovery of 
his property, forfeited by the previous government under the now repealed 
Forfeiture Act which allowed the government to seize property in the interest of 
the economy. His argument was that the Forfeiture Act was unconstitutional 
and contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was part of 
the laws of Malawi. In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim the court stated thus: ‘The 
doctrine of state sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament in legislating, are the 
basis, I believe, upon which, in common law jurisdictions, international law must 
be incorporated in municipal law for it to be enforceable. It logically follows 
therefore that sovereign states have the authority to determine the extent and 
limit to which they wish to incorporate international law. This is exactly what 
Parliament did by enacting s.2(1) of the 1966 Constitution and the proviso in s. 
2(2) thereof.’168 The court went further to hold that ‘where there is a conflict 
between international law and municipal law, in cases where they are both 
applicable law, the question is one of interpretation and construction in order to 
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determine the intention of the legislature.’169 In resolving this conflict the court 
decided that ‘municipal law within a sovereign territory, is supreme to 
international law, if a conflict can be avoided by construction let the courts do 
so.’170The court was obviously of the view that it was up to any sovereign state 
just like Malawi to decide how international law would be applied in its territory 
and within whatever limits are put in place by the legislature. It must also be 
borne in mind that this case was decided on the basis of the old constitutional 
order and not on the basis of the 1995 Constitution. In fact the court was just 
following the reasoning of an earlier court decision in Mwakawanga v The 
Republic171 on the supremacy of municipal law over international law where 
there is a conflict between the two. However the court in both cases did 
appreciate the fact that in interpreting domestic law the court should adopt an 
interpretation which would not be in conflict with international law. However this 
interpretation that domestic/municipal law is supreme as regards international 
law, would in the present international criminal law regime be counter to the 
universality of prosecuting individuals accused of committing the ICC crimes or 
international crimes under the Rome Statute. This is so because States Parties 
to the Rome Statute have an obligation to participate in the suppression of 
those crimes since as already observed the ICC is supposed to be 
complementary to national jurisdictions in that regard. 
In the current constitutional order courts in Malawi have continued to have a 
disjointed approach in the applicability of international law. It is unfortunate that 
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cases available are civil cases as opposed to criminal cases. However that 
weakness is cured by the fact that the principles employed with regards to 
international law in Malawi are the same. In some instances the courts have 
just referred to an international agreement as forming part of the municipal law 
in Malawi but fall short of a detailed discussion as to its status as regards 
applicability. In the case of Kambiningi Khazi Jones et al v The Refugee 
Committee (The Attorney General)172the plaintiffs were challenging by way of 
judicial review the decision stripping them of their refugee status in Malawi. The 
court casually referred to the 1959 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
refugees and its 1967 New York Protocol as municipal law in Malawi by virtue 
of Malawi signing and ratifying it, and held that the decision being challenged 
was justified.173 One would have expected the court to make an in depth 
analysis of the applicability of the Convention in Malawi and give reasons for 
applying the Convention. The constitution however empowers the court in 
interpreting the constitution to inter alia, where applicable, have regard to 
current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case law.174 
However as the jurisprudence has been and is being developed on the 
applicability of international law in Malawi, courts are more willing to uphold the 
importance of international law in Malawi. This is more evident in the first 
adoption case of an infant, David Banda by the famous singer, Madonna, in 
Malawi.175 Having considered that Malawi ratified the Convention on the Rights 
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173 Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 313 of 2005 (HC), p.4. 
174 Republic of Malawi Constitution, s.11 (2) (c ). 
175 Adoption Cause No. 2 of 2006 (HC). 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
of the Child in 1991, and also that Malawi is a party to the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the court held that these conventions are 
binding on Malawi.176 This was despite the fact that these conventions have not 
been incorporated as part of the municipal law in Malawi. The court then went 
on to address the issue if any, of inconsistency between these conventions and 
municipal law and rightly in my view, held and directed as follows, ‘If for a 
moment the argument that the Conventions are not part of our law found 
favour, then at least on part of the court the duty is to interpret and apply our 
Statutory law, so far as the spirit of the Statute could allow, so that it is in 
conformity and not in conflict with our established obligations under these 
Conventions. And therefore that unless the statute, by its words and spirit 
compels the courts to ignore international laws that is binding on us, the 
practice of our courts is to avoid a clash and the way is to construe  the 
domestic statute in such a way as to avoid breaching the obligation.’177 The 
court was therefore interpreting the municipal law in such a way that it does not 
breach international law. However it is worth noting that the court held that the 
international conventions were binding on Malawi despite that they had not 
been incorporated into the municipal law after ratification. 
In the second adoption case of yet another infant, Mercy James, by again 
Madonna,178 the dilemma of the courts on the applicability of international law in 
Malawi is evident. The court in this case, decided by a different Judge, again 
referred to the CRC and the ACHPR and never critically discussed the 
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applicability of these instruments in Malawi. The court in reference to the 
definition ‘of the best interests of the child’ as provided in the 
instruments/conventions, with reference to the Malawi statute, only stated that 
‘the second issue to be considered is the issue of the welfare of the child. In my 
attempts to make sense of this requirement under section 4 of the Act, I 
referred to two international instruments: the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACHPR) to which Malawi is a signatory.’179 Firstly the court confused ACHPR 
as standing for the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
instead of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However the 
point to be noted is that the court is just referring to these instruments without 
stating the position of their applicability in Malawi. Thus two HC decisions 
depict two different approaches to how courts deal with international 
agreements ratified by Malawi where incorporation did not materialize. This 
clearly demonstrates that section 211 of the constitution already referred to, 
creates legal uncertainty on the applicability of international agreements ratified 
by Malawi, but not incorporated into municipal law. In that regard one would 
have expected the MSCA to offer clear and unambiguous direction on the 
interpretation of section 211 of the constitution, and thus the status of 
international agreements and customary international law in Malawi.  
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4.3.1.2 MSCA Decision  
The HC in second adoption case by Madonna, having declined to grant her the 
adoption order, she appealed to the MSCA180 and the MSCA had the 
opportunity to decide on the said application and status of international 
agreements and customary international law by interpreting the provisions of 
section 211 of the Constitution. Section 211 of the Constitution provides as 
follows: ‘(1) Any international agreement entered into after the commencement 
of this Constitution shall form part of the law of the Republic if so provided by or 
under an Act of Parliament; (2) Binding international agreements entered into 
before the commencement of this Constitution shall, continue to bind the 
Republic unless otherwise provided by an Act of Parliament; (3) Customary 
international law, unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament, shall form part of the law of the Republic.’ The MSCA was thus 
vexed with inter alia, the interpretation of section 211 of the Constitution. Thus 
the MSCA in its quest to interpret section 211 adopted the approach of 
supremacy of the constitution and statutes over international agreements and 
customary international law. The MSCA stated and directed as follows: ‘We 
think that the correct reading of that section is to follow the clear language that 
has been employed. If one does that one will find that the clear thread that runs 
through the fabric of all the subsections of section 211 of our Constitution is that 
all international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution or after the 
Constitution are only binding if they are not in conflict with the clear provisions 
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of our statutes. Put differently, whether an international agreement forms part of 
our law, regardless on when it was entered into, will depend on whether there is 
no Act of Parliament that provides to the contrary. And the question whether 
customary international law forms part of our law will depend on whether it is 
consistent with our Constitution or our statutes.’181 (Emphasis added). The 
MSCA went on and stated that ‘If the executive branch of Government wishes 
any of the international conventions which it has freely acceded to, to have any 
force of law, then it should bring such convention before parliament which has 
the Constitutional mandate to make all laws of the land.’182 
It is thus the position of the law in Malawi, as interpreted by the MSCA, that 
international agreements or conventions entered into, or ratified by Malawi must 
be incorporated into municipal law by legislation through parliament. If this is 
not done, they cannot form part of the municipal law. Furthermore, that such 
international agreements/conventions must not be inconsistent with the 
Constitution or statutes to be applicable in Malawi. Similarly that customary 
international law can only be applicable in Malawi if it is also not in conflict with 
the constitution and statutes. This then creates an impediment to the 
applicability of the Rome Statute in Malawi without legislative incorporation. 
This position of the MSCA further runs contrary to the expectations of the Rome 
Statute and norms of customary international law as regards holding war 
criminals or those who commit the ICC crimes liable for prosecution by every 
State Party to the Rome Statute. A war criminal arrested in Malawi might thus 
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not be prosecuted in Malawi if the Rome Statute is not incorporated into 
municipal law of the land, this regardless of the fact that Malawi ratified the 
Rome Statute. However the courts in Malawi are not creating any new ground 
with their approach as it has been widely accepted that ‘national courts are 
generally hesitant, in case of conflict between applicable international law and 
national norm, to recognize international obligations and they end up giving 
precedence to local law.’183 What is of paramount importance in Malawi is that 
legislative incorporation should always follow ratification of international 
agreements. Even in the UK, ‘a treaty ratified by the Queen will has no effect 
under municipal law until an Act of Parliament is passed to give effect to it.’184 
The Rome Statute must therefore be domesticated in Malawi through 
legislation in order to make it part of the municipal law. Moreover treaty law 
requires that ‘a treaty must be performed by according to its tenor.’185 In that 
regard, and considering the obligations of Malawi under the Rome Statute there 
are several issues to be considered in incorporating the Rome Statute into 
municipal law for Malawi to effectively contribute in the suppression of the ICC 
crimes. 
4.4 Considerations on Domesticating the Rome Statute    
 As has already been observed, in the suppression of the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, national jurisdictions have the primary 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute such crimes, and the ICC is just 
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complementary to national jurisdictions.186 The principle of complementarity 
thus ‘denotes that the ICC will only exercise its jurisdiction if States remain 
wholly inactive vis-à-vis these ICC crimes or, in case States investigate, 
prosecute and adjudicate cases, if they prove to be unwilling or unable to do so 
genuinely.’187 It must always be the understanding of States Parties that ‘the 
ICC should only be activated when no domestic alternatives exist.’188 States 
parties, just like Malawi, have to critically analyse their legal systems in line with 
the complementarity role of the ICC, and must establish jurisdiction over the 
core crimes. This will entail a critical look at the substantive criminal law and 
whether it fully encompasses the core crimes or the ICC crimes, procedural 
issues relating to cooperation with the ICC and whether domestic legal system 
has sufficient safeguards to enable the investigation and prosecution of these 
ICC crimes. 
 
4.4.1 Substantive Law 
Under the Rome Statute ‘substantive law is understood as encompassing the 
crimes defined in Articles 6-8, that is, the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, and the general principles of criminal law spelled out 
in Part 3 of the Rome Statute.’189 In that regard, a State party like Malawi, must 
examine its penal laws to see if they provide for these core crimes, and if they 
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are in tandem with the definition of the core crimes as defined in the Rome 
Statute. This analysis will inevitably show whether Malawi can effectively 
investigate and prosecute these core crimes. In Malawi the Penal Code190 is 
the statute which establishes a code of criminal law and thus defines conduct 
which is criminal and punishable. There are offences like murder,191 rape,192 
kidnapping,193  and abduction of girls under sixteen194, which might constitute 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However the definition of 
these offences and their elements do not conform to those in the Rome Statute. 
Murder is committed under the Penal Code ‘where any person with malice 
aforethought causes the death of another by an unlawful act or omission.’195 
Genocide is committed when certain acts are committe  ‘with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,’196 
whereas, crimes against humanity to entail criminal liability require that certain 
acts, such as murder, ‘be committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’197 
Although it is possible to prosecute an individual for genocide or crimes against 
humanity under the Penal Code, in Malawi, where murder committed, the 
gravity of the offence of genocide or crimes against humanity will be lost out. 
This is despite that in Malawi the severest punishment is reserved for those 
who commit murder, where the maximum sentence is death. Likewise in New 
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191 Penal Code, s.209. 
192 Penal Code, s.132. 
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Zealand despite having general offences which could constitute the ICC 
offences, they adopted the ICC offences under the International Crimes and 
International Criminal Court Act, 2000 ‘because their general offences could not 
and did not completely capture for example the nature of the offence of 
genocide as the Rome Statute provided.’198 Hay further argues that this is also 
because ‘the mental element required for the offence of genocide is more 
specific than that required for murder, and more over if an incident that 
amounted to genocide did not involve the death of a person, the maximum 
penalty available could be comparably low.’199  
Similarly in Malawi one might also be prosecuted under the Penal Code for war 
crimes, where one causes grievous bodily harm to another. Again the gravity of 
the offence will be lost. Under the Penal Code the offence is simply committed 
where any person unlawfully does grievous harm to another.200 Whereas war 
crimes have to be committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large 
scale commission of such crimes.201 It is therefore required to effectively 
investigate and prosecute the ICC offences under domestic law, that domestic 
law must specifically provide for substantive law regarding these crimes as is 
envisaged in the Rome Statute. It has been stated that the ICC 
complementarity to be effective, ‘States must respond, and have responded by 
adopting implementing legislation enabling their authorities to enforce 
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international criminal law as applicable to the  core crimes.’202 ‘Inability of a 
State to effectively investigate and prosecute the core crimes might arise from 
inadequacies of substantive legislation, that is, defects of domestic laws.’203 
Although ‘the Rome Statute does not impose or establish any obligations on 
States parties regarding the incorporation of the Statute’s substantive criminal 
law into national law,’204 it envisages that ‘it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.’205 It is safe to conclude that ‘such a duty entails establishing 
jurisdiction, and the practice of States parties to implement the substantive law 
clearly establishes such an agreement, understood as a common 
understanding about the meaning of the treaty as requiring them to do so.’206 
General criminal law, entails the State being concerned as opposed to the 
Rome Statute with apprehending and punishing criminal within its boredrs.207 
Malawi as a State party to the Rome Statute cannot rely on her Penal Code to 
effectively investigate and prosecute the core crimes without transposing or 
incorporating the core crimes into the municipal law. 
 
4.4.2 Procedural Law 
Further considerations must relate to issues requiring cooperation with the ICC. 
It is a mandatory obligation or requirement for States Parties to ‘cooperate fully 
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with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within its 
jurisdiction.’208 To fulfill that obligation States Parties are under obligation ‘to 
ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the 
forms of cooperation which are specified under Part IX of the Rome Statute.’209 
The ICC will require cooperation from States Parties with regard to inter alia 
surrender of arrested persons to the Court,210 provisional arrest of the person 
sought,211 assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions,212 and 
cooperation in respect of waiver of immunity and consent to surrender.213 It is 
thus imperative for States Parties in order that they offer the assistance 
required by the ICC, to have legislation to that effect. States parties may also 
be required to amend their existing statutes which might impede their 
cooperation with the ICC, inter alia, relating to extradition or surrender of 
persons to the ICC and immunities of Heads of States and diplomats. Article 93 
of the Rome Statute envisages several forms of cooperation required.214 The 
UK, New Zealand and South Africa, have succeeded in encompassing in their 
                                                            
208 Rome Statute, Art. 86. 
209 Rome Statute, Art. 88. 
210 Rome Statute, Art. 89. 
211 Rome Statute, Art. 92. 
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214 These include: identification and whereabouts of  persons or the location of items; the taking 
of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, including expert 
opinions and reports necessary to the Court; the questioning of any person being investigated 
or prosecuted; service of documents, including judicial documents; facilitating the voluntary 
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respective legislations domesticating the Rome Statute, to adopt the procedural 
issues relating to various cooperation requirements of the ICC. 
 
4.4.3 Legal Impediments 
Malawi, as has been demonstrated, is a State Party to the Rome Statute. Apart 
from the need for domestication of the Rome Statute, Malawi has to critically 
analyse her statutes, in order to bring them in tandem with the Rome Statute. It 
would be an anomaly to ratify the Rome Statute and then fail to apply it due to 
conflict with some municipal law. Legal impediments must therefore be done 
away with in order to effectively implement the purports of the Rome Statute. 
This might require amending those statutes that hinder effective domestication 
of the Rome Statute. 
 
4.4.3.1 The Constitution 
The starting point must be the constitution itself. The Malawi Constitution 
stipulates that ‘No person holding the office of President shall be charged with 
any criminal offence in any court during his (or her) term of office.’215 This would 
be a legal impediment in that if the President committed the core crimes during 
his tenure, he would not be liable to prosecution until he left office. The 
dilemma would be if for example, like Mugabe of Zimbabwe, he just clings to 
power by whatever means. However the Al Bashir situation demonstrates that 
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the ICC would then assume jurisdiction over the matter. It must also be 
admitted that even if the constitution did not provide such immunity it would 
possibly still be practically impossible to prosecute a sitting President within the 
domestic set-up unless if he were to be impeached first. Holding individuals 
criminally liable for these core crimes is premised on prosecuting any individual 
who commits such crimes regardless of his or her official capacity. Heads of 
States are therefore, not immune under international criminal law. In that 
regard, the ICC assuming jurisdiction in such a case would seem to be a more 
plausible alternative. But still the constitution must be re-aligned to the tenets 
and aspirations of the Rome Statute. The other legal impediment relates to 
extradition treaties under the Extradition Act. 
 
4.4.3.2 Extradition Act  
The Extradition Act empowers the Government of Malawi ‘to enter into 
arrangements with the government of any country, for the surrender on a basis 
of reciprocity, of fugitive offenders.’216 This provision might seem non-
problematic as regards the application of the Rome Statute in Malawi. 
However, Malawi might enter into such extradition treaties with non-parties to 
the Rome Statute, and if a national of such non-state is caught by the 
provisions of the Rome Statute, Malawi would be in a dilemma. It has been 
noted that on ‘23 September 2003, Malawi signed such agreement with the The 
USA, a non-Party to the Rome Statute, the effect of which was to compel 
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Malawi, not to cooperate with the ICC regarding USA personnel indicted by the 
ICC.’217Such an agreement, under the Extradition Act, thus constitutes a legal 
impediment to Malawi’s cooperation with the ICC as required of a State Party 
by the ICC. Malawi, must therefore, have a relook of the Act in order to bring it 
in tandem with the Rome Statute, thereby removing the impediment. This might 
require inserting a provision in the Act to the effect that where there is a conflict 
in respect of different extradition request primary consideration will be to the 
ICC. A good example occurred in Germany where according to Satzger, ‘upon 
ratification of the Rome Statute, Article 16(2) of the Basic Law had to be altered 
in order to make it possible to extradite German citizens to the ICC.’218 
Apparently it was initially against the Basic Law to extradite a German citizen. 
Malawi can therefore amend it’s the Extradition Act to remove the legal 
impediment to the applicability of the Rome Statute, hence facilitate effective 
cooperation with the ICC. This would have to be done, though, bearing in mind 
the provisions of Articles 90 and 98 of the Rome Statute as regards competing 
requests, and cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender. 
 
4.4.3.3 Immunities and Privileges Act 
This is an Act which purports to determine the extent of the immunity of foreign 
states from the jurisdiction of the courts of Malawi; to provide for diplomatic and 
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consular privileges and immunities. Malawi must consider that according to 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute, immunity is not a bar to the ICC assuming 
jurisdiction in a particular matter or issue. However, this impediment might be 
overcome by the ICC itself as it is empowered under Article 98 to seek waiver 
of immunity of a particular person from any concerned State. However the Act 
must provide for such eventuality in order to be in tandem with the Rome 
Statute, and avoid any impediments. This will entail Malawi establishing 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the core crimes, without being unable 
so to do and waiting for the ICC to assume jurisdiction. The South African 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act has 
boldly removed immunity in respect of the core crimes. This might be a possible 
route for Malawi to follow. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The ‘utility of a legal system and the law depends on its certainty.’219 There is 
legal uncertainty in Malawi in so far as application of international law and 
international agreements is concerned. This affects the applicability of 
international law and international agreements. The courts have further 
contributed to this uncertainty through judgments that are at most contradictory 
as regards the application of international law in Malawi. As demonstrated, 
there are also some Statutes or legal impediments which would render the 
applicability of the Rome Statute almost meaningless and ineffective. It is of 
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utmost importance that Malawi should surmount the existing legal impediments, 
and implement the Rome Statute, through necessary legislation. This would 
create certainty in the legal system as the judiciary would be able to have 
uniformity in the application and interpretation of the Rome Statute. 
It is also imperative that the incorporation of the Rome Statute be carried out in 
such a way that the meaning and effects of its provisions is not lost. The 
domesticating legislation must thus, incorporate the Statute’s substantive 
criminal, procedural law, and all aspects envisaged in the Statute. International 
law by its very nature suffers from a general weakness in lack of 
enforcement.220 It is therefore, the responsibility. and obligation of States 
Parties, like Malawi to assist in the enforcement of the Rome Statute by 
domesticating it. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
Throughout the development and evolution of international criminal law, the 
golden thread that weaves through, is individual criminal responsibility. The 
ultimate apparatus for holding individuals criminally responsible for commission 
of the core crimes, that is, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
is the Rome Statute and the ICC. However, the ICC has not usurped the 
jurisdiction of States Parties to investigate and prosecute these core crimes. 
States Parties still retain the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute 
the core crimes, and the ICC is expected just to complement the States Parties’ 
jurisdictions.221The ICC will only assume jurisdiction if a State Party is unwilling 
and unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute.222 A State Party must 
therefore establish jurisdiction in order to be able to investigate and prosecute 
core crimes. This entails effective implementation of the Rome Statute in 
municipal or domestic law. And implementation of the Rome Statute must be 
carried out in such a way that it leaves no doubt about its applicability under 
municipal law. If there is doubt about the Rome Statute’s applicability, that will 
create uncertainty, and as such, its objects and aspirations will not be fulfilled. 
The paper therefore argues that full implementation of the Rome Statute in 
national jurisdictions, can only be meaningfully achieved through legislation. In 
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that regard, the paper argues, and has demonstrated that for Malawi, to 
effectively fulfill obligations arising from ratification of the Rome Statute, it must 
implement it through legislation. The uncertainty which exists in Malawi, on the 
applicability of international law and international agreements, weighs heavily 
on the side of domesticating the Rome Statute through legislation. Malawi 
already recognizes the need and importance of domesticating the Rome 
Statute through necessary legislative action. The then Minister of Justice, 
Professor A.P. Mutharika stated that ‘the ICC lacks many of the institutional 
structures necessary for a comprehensive handling of a criminal matter. It has 
no police of its own and no prisons. To a large extent, the ICC relies on national 
institutions to co-operate in bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, in order to 
co-operate fully with the ICC, a State Party is obliged to have a range of 
powers, facilities and procedures in place. The best way to achieve this is by 
promulgating the necessary laws and regulations aimed at domesticating the 
Rome Statute.’ 223 (Emphasis added). It therefore clear that there is political will 
to domesticate the Rome Statute in Malawi through legislation. However, 
political will alone is not enough if it is not translated into action, which action is 
the actual domestication of the Rome Statute in Malawi. 
The paper has further demonstrated that there are different modes of 
implementing international law and international agreements. However with the 
constitutional framework in Malawi, this paper argues, that for Malawi, 
                                                            
223 Speech delivered at a workshop on the International Criminal Court: Rome Statute 
Implementing Legislation for Malawi, on 26-27 February 2010, Crossroads Hotel, Lilongwe, 
Malawi. In attendance was Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, Madam Fautou Bensouda.   
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
legislative incorporation is the key to effective implementation of the Rome 
Statute. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Malawi by ratifying the Rome Statute assumed international obligations for the 
suppression of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These 
crimes, according to the Rome Statute, are the most serious crimes of 
international concern. Malawi must therefore, demonstrate its commitment to 
the aspirations of the Rome Statute by enacting enabling legislation to 
incorporate the Rome Statute in its municipal law. Ratification alone is 
insufficient. Section 211(1) of the Constitution already provides the legal 
framework through which international agreements can only be implemented in 
Malawi, through legislation. Malawi must therefore adhere to that Constitutional 
provision. Examples are abound on how other States Parties have 
domesticated the Rome Statute without diluting its objects. Malawi should 
emulate those examples. 
All laws which impede the effective domestication of the Rome Statute must be 
amended to bring them in pari pasu or in conformity with the Rome Statute. 
These include but not limited to, the Extradition Act, the Immunities and 
Privileges Act and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction must also be created to enable the investigation and prosecution of 
the core crimes even in instances of their commission taking place wholly 
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outside Malawi. Where appropriate, the provisions of the domesticating 
legislation may be drafted with reference to the relevant Articles in the Rome 
Statute. For the substantive criminal law of the Rome Statute, that must be 
incorporated wholesale into the domestic law so that the grave nature of the 
crimes is not lost through redrafting. 
On immunity of persons, the domestic legislation must be clear that no one will 
be protected if they commit the core crimes regardless of their official capacity, 
and diplomatic status. This will send a clear signal that Malawi is not a haven 
for perpetrators of these core crimes. The South African ICC Act can be 
emulated in that regard. President al Bashir failed to travel to South Africa 
because he had no immunity there and he faced arrest if he went there. 
All in all Malawi must ensure that it enacts legislation, which will fully 
domesticate the Rome Statute in Malawi. Ratification of the Rome Statute is 
meaningless without domesticating it in Malawi, through legislation. And Malawi 
should, just like New Zealand be at liberty to incorporate, in addition to the core 
crimes, other serious crimes which will enhance Malawi’s obligations under the 
Rome Statute, and Malawi’s resolve in fighting impunity. 
(Word count: 19,130 words) 
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